The Iranian negotiations have practically lost their impact

Given that we hear contradictory statements about the outcome of the negotiations and the government seems to have closed the budget based on the non-lifting of sanctions, we want to know your 9 forecasts of the business situation of the private sector and the country’s economy next year and that to improve What solutions do you suggest to the government to prevent the situation from deteriorating? The events that took place last winter, when Mr. Biden came to power and the resumption of the Borjam talks, until the end of Mr. Rouhani’s administration, had points that can be further predicted by looking at those points and behaviors. The first point was that the two sides, Iran and the United States, no longer seemed to have the same expectations from Barjam , meaning that the United States wanted something more than Barjam 2015, and Iran was not satisfied with anything less than Barjam 2015, and practically shared the same expectations. , Called “at least Barjam”. These few months of negotiations, in addition to the ongoing negotiations in Mr. Ra’isi’s government, show that his government has also come to the conclusion that Barjam , despite much criticism of this government, will be the best agreement that can take place and the ceiling This is something that will be negotiated in this government. Another point that I think is very important is that we found that the Iranian regime’s view of the negotiations is not a strategic one. In other words, the framework of the economy and the country’s future development strategies are not going to go through these negotiations, and Iran sees the negotiations only as a case-by-case agreement with the Group of Five plus one, and at this stage the United States to lift sanctions. In fact, it seems that Barjam has no strategic economic value for governing Iran, but in the political and security spheres, Barjam is viewed from a strategic perspective. Of course, from the very beginning, many experts considered Barjam a security agreement, not an economic one, and such a view has led the Iranian government and, to a large extent, the five-plus-one countries to seek to prioritize security and political interests. Perhaps the difference between Barjam 2015 and 2022 can be stated that in Barjam 2015, Iran’s view was more economic and the view of five plus one was mainly political and security, but in Barjam 2022, Iran’s view became more political and security and sought more guarantees and It is a political preference, and for this reason it strictly avoids tying the issue to other political and security issues, such as Iran’s role in the region or to military, arms and missile development.

With this argument, should not we be optimistic about the economic achievements of Borjam 2022?

Realizing this, it seems that what will happen will be a tactical agreement to maintain a biopolitical security channel for Iranian sovereignty. I think this form of agreement will eventually happen, but we should not have the optimism that we had for Barjam 2015 or the six rounds of negotiations in Mr. Rouhani’s government for the new Barjam . In other words, we must imagine that this agreement is a tactical agreement for the parties (five plus one and Iran) and a tactical agreement can not be a stable, growing, developing and continuous agreement, and in the future, the interests of all parties, especially Iran and Save America. In general, the message of such an approach is that this agreement can not be sustained, and only the initial space to lift some of the sanctions, the relative possibility of selling Iranian oil, the release of some of Iran’s blocked resources, all under close scrutiny of the US and five countries. It will be another. In this sense, the economic freedom that we were gradually gaining in Barjam 2015, although not yet achieved, and at that time we only had the vision, we can never achieve, and the fragility of Barjam 2022 can limit the long-term exploitation of the benefits of this Agree lead.

Specifically with respect to the new signals that the market is showing in response to the possibility of a deal. What impact will Borjam 2022 have on various economic areas, including the private sector business environment?

In my opinion, given the recent market signals, if something unexpected does not happen, we are approaching a kind of agreement that will be much more limited than the 2015 BRJAM. In fact, the appearance of this agreement may indicate the lifting of sanctions, but inwardly, despite the fact that Iran is seeking verification, the amount of opening that could be expected in the 2015 UNHCR can never be expected in the new UNHCR, because the five plus one countries to some extent (US and Europe more, China and Russia less) are sensitive to Iran or closer to nuclear power, so they will have more intensive care, while other points of contention with the P5 + 1 group, which has been in the past, have intensified because the government Thirteenth, which is more right-wing, has made Western countries more concerned about their concerns. Even other indirect stakeholders in the region, led by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, neighbors, and eventually Israel, have become more sensitive to the agreement than ever before, interacting more with the negotiators, as if the interaction was hidden in the 2015 UN Security Council. It has become apparent today, and even meetings have been mediated, raising the convergence between direct and indirect stakeholders to think and act on sensitive points in the future.

With this explanation, we can see an initial and limited agreement in the not too distant future, but we should not rely too much on it, because this agreement has a honeymoon that can reduce the exchange rate and increase revenues from oil sales to some extent. Give. This agreement can reduce our foreign trade costs, but it will not have much effect on the size of our foreign trade, because in my opinion, after Borjam 2015, the size of our foreign trade will not increase except for oil and other petroleum products, because the ways to circumvent sanctions We have learned a lot and to the extent that we have export production capacity in the country, we export. Therefore, a possible initial and limited agreement from this perspective will have no significant effect on Iran’s foreign trade except in reducing costs. Of course, increasing oil sales and the government’s need to sell the resulting currency will open the door to imports. In the field of investment, I do not think we have a positive outlook for large-scale foreign direct investment, because large multinational corporations are more sensitive to working with Iran and do not enter Iran in such a way that if something else happens, they will incur heavy exit costs. Small companies may come to Iran with a view to implementing the project and reaping faster profits, or medium-sized companies with small investments. In the field of domestic investment, we are also facing a neutralizing situation. In fact, this agreement can increase the investment of economic units with the intention of continuing to work in the country or the non-governmental public sector and part of the private sector, but on the other hand, the neutralizing force, the capital outflow that we had in the country since the 90s, will continue. And finally causes the fixed capital formation rate in the country, which has been negative for the last 10 years, to close to zero, or to be so positive for a while that it can not be the driver of the country’s economic growth for many years. . In this way, we may be able to benefit from this agreement in one to two years, and then the evening of exploitation of this agreement will come, unless the political and security approach of the country changes seriously and fundamentally.

The positive expectation that the market has for the deal has calmed down. In the last two or three weeks, the market has reached a relative calm and the exchange rate has gradually decreased, and price inflammations in markets such as cars, home appliances, other imported goods and even food, minus the part where the 4200 Toman currency has been cut, have somewhat subsided. . These are all prognoses for agreement. Accordingly, it can be judged that if an agreement is reached, positive expectations will continue in our economy for some time, even with a steeper slope, and vice versa, if the market feels that an agreement is not reached, it will become inflamed again.

But assuming an agreement, structural problems still plague our economy. What has become the burden of economic problems and economic crises is our disconnection from the international community, the inability to sell oil and the inability to collect government foreign exchange earnings. The agreement, of course, can make the conditions a little more favorable for the reform of economic structures, but it is not able to solve these structural problems. It should be noted that the current government has little social capital, the demands of various groups remain unanswered, and the government’s approach is not a favorable response to these demands. Therefore, there is a lot of concern in the government and the possibility of structural reforms has become more difficult. In addition to these cases, it should be noted that, unfortunately, the body of the country’s bureaucracy has become very weak and thin, especially since less experience, background and knowledge are seen in the new government appointments, and it seems that these men and women are not structural reformers.